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ABSTRACT 
A classic property rights question looms large in the field 
of patent law: where do the rights of inventors end and the 
rights of the public begin?  The right of inventors to modify 
the scope of their claimed inventions, even after the patent 
issues, is in direct tension with the concepts of public notice 
and the public domain.  The Patent Act currently permits 
broadening of claims so long as a reissue application 
demonstrating intent to broaden is filed within two years of 
the original patent issue.  Over the years, however, this 
relatively straightforward statutory provision has sparked 
numerous disputes over its meaning and application.  
On September 8, 2011, the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit heard oral arguments for In re Staats.  In this 
case, Apple Computer, Inc. appeals the rejection of a 
continuation reissue patent application.  The U.S. Patent & 
Trademark Office and the Board of Patent Appeals and 
Interferences rejected the application on the grounds that 
Apple attempted to broaden the scope of its patent claims in a 
manner not “foreseeable” more than eight years after the 
patent first issued.  Apple contends that the language of the 
statute and prior case law permit its interpretation, and the 
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application should be allowed in the interest of innovation. 
This issue is hardly a new one—this submission highlights 
nearly 140 years of case law, legislative history, and statutory 
shaping pertaining to broadening reissues.  We analyze the 
issues raised in the briefs from Staats, as well as the oral 
arguments.  Finally, we discuss from a practitioner’s 
perspective what the Federal Circuit could do—and should 
do—in the field of broadening reissues. 
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 From its grounding in the U.S. Constitution2 to its 
staggeringly complex application in modern society and business, 
intellectual property—and in particular, patent law—has always 
required a reasonable balance between adequate public notice and 
providing enforceable rights.  One question looms large in the field of 
patent law: where do the rights of inventors end and the rights of the 
public begin?  Analyzing this question poses significant difficulties, 
even after the grant of a patent, as demonstrated by the explosive 
growth in post-grant adjudication both at the U.S. Patent & 
Trademark Office (USPTO) and in the courts.3  Portions of the recent 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act appear to reinforce that the scope 
                                                
2 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times 
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”) 
3 The year 2010 saw more grants of reissue patents and more applications for 
inter partes and ex parte reexamination than in any prior year.  See UNITED 
STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. PATENT STATISTICS, CALENDAR 
YEARS 1963–2010 (Mar. 2011), 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.pdf  (The USPTO 
granted 847 reissue patents in 2010, a record number more than 46% higher than 
the previous record year); UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, EX 
PARTE REEXAMINATION FILING DATA (June 30, 2011), 
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/EP_quarterly_report_June_2011.pdf (2010 saw a 
record 780 applications for ex parte reexamination, more than 20% more than in 
2009); UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, INTER PARTES 
REEXAMINATION FILING DATA (June 30, 2011), 
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/IP_quarterly_report_June_2011.pdf (The number 
of inter partes reexamination applications has increased every year since the 
inception of the proceeding in 1999).  
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of property rights accorded by the “limited monopoly” of a patent 
may shift during the life of the patent.4 
¶2 One of the most straightforward ways patent owners can 
expand the limited monopoly of a patent is by seeking increased 
claim scope via one or more broadening reissue patent applications.  
While patent owners may narrow the scope of patent claims at any 
time during the life of the patent, they may only broaden claim scope 
for a limited period of time after issuance of the patent.5  Despite this 
relatively straightforward statutory provision in 35 U.S.C. § 251, 
however, an expansive body of case law has construed the provision, 
dating back well over a century.6  The statute clearly requires notice 
of the intent to broaden, and current jurisprudence specifies that 
manifestation of such intent should have been “foreseeable” within 
two years from the issue date of the patent.7  Under what 
circumstances, if any, should a patent owner be allowed to broaden 
claim scope beyond the statutory window of two years after issuance 
of the patent?   
                                                
4 See, e.g., Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. § 6, chs. 
31–32 (signed into law by President Obama on Sept. 16, 2011) (addressing post-
grant review procedures). 
5  See U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING 
PROCEDURE (MPEP) § 1412.03 (8th ed. Rev. 8, July 2010) (discussing 
implementation of 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2006) (“No reissue patent shall be granted 
enlarging the scope of the original patent unless applied for within two years 
from the grant of the original patent.”)). 
6 Although 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2006) has only been codified in its current form for 
fifty-nine years (see Patent Act of July 19, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 
792 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–318 (2006)), the concept of patent 
reissue dates back much further.  See, e.g., Miller v. Brass Co., 104 U.S. 350 
(1881); see also Part I, infra. 
7 See Ex parte Staats, No. 2009-007162, 2010 WL 1725728, at *8 (B.P.A.I. Apr. 
26, 2010) (emphasis in original) (internal citations and footnotes omitted): 
Simply put, the broadening in the present reissue application is in a 
manner that was completely unforeseeable by the public within the two-
year period following the original patent’s issuance—a fact likewise 
admitted at the oral hearing.  Despite Appellants’ arguments to the 
contrary, permitting such an unforeseeable broadening nearly eight 
years after Appellants’ original patent issued simply runs counter to the 
underlying public notice function of § 251—notice that must be timely to 
ensure meaningful reliance on the finality and certainty of patent rights. 
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¶3 Patent applications are notoriously complicated legal 
documents, difficult to draft in a manner that accurately captures the 
full scope of the invention without unnecessary limitations.  All too 
often, the task of drafting their disclosures is in inexperienced hands.  
The current patent system provides little incentive for patentees or the 
USPTO to spend sufficient time and money to prosecute a high-
quality patent;8 the result is a kudzu-like thicket of low-quality, 
under-descriptive patents.9  Almost 120 years ago in Topliff v. Topliff, 
the Supreme Court demonstrated remarkable foresight about today’s 
reissue dilemma.  
To hold that a patent can never be reissued for an enlarged claim 
would be not only to override the obvious intent of the statute, but 
would operate in many cases with great hardship upon the patentee.  
The specification and claims of a patent, particularly if the invention 
be at all complicated, constitute one of the most difficult legal 
instruments to draw with accuracy, and in view of the fact that 
valuable inventions are often placed in the hands of inexperienced 
persons to prepare such specifications and claims, it is no matter of 
surprise that the latter frequently fail to describe with requisite 
certainty the exact invention of the patentee, and err either in claiming 
that which the patentee had not in fact invented, or in omitting some 
element which was a valuable or essential part of his actual invention.  
Under such circumstances, it would be manifestly unjust to deny him 
the benefit of a reissue to secure to him his actual invention, provided 
it is evident that there has been a mistake and he has been guilty of no 
want of reasonable diligence in discovering it . . . .”10 
                                                
8 See generally Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 
NW. U. L. REV. 1495 (2001) (weighing incentives of patentees and the USPTO, 
and finding that both parties benefit from the filing of a higher volume of patent 
applications that are of lower quality: “In short, the PTO doesn’t do a very 
detailed job of examining patents, but we probably don’t want it to.  It is 
‘rationally ignorant’ of the objective validity of patents, in economics lingo, 
because it is too costly for the PTO to discover those facts.”  Id. at 1497 (internal 
footnote omitted)). 
9 See Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents before Breakfast: 
Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY 
TECH. L. J. 577, 577, 579, 588–91 (1999) (arguing that the increased volume of 
patent applications, particularly as patentable subject matter has expanded in the 
courts, has “pushed the patent system into crisis.”). 
10 Topliff v. Topliff, 145 U.S. 156, 171 (1892); see also P. J. Federico, 
Intervening Rights in Patent Reissues, 30 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 603, 614–15 
(1961–1962) (citing Topliff in the context of intervening rights provisions). 
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Reading Topliff over a century later, it appears that some things never 
change.11 
¶4 Where reissue applications likely serve a valuable function in 
the patent system, how can we separate the wheat from the chaff so 
that patent owners may broaden claim scope after the statutory 
window of two years after issuance has closed, while still protecting 
the public’s right to rely on the scope of the patent as originally 
issued?  Recently, this question has again come under scrutiny in the 
courts.  In 2010, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences 
(Board) denied Apple Computer, Inc. the right to broaden the claims 
of five of its patents on the grounds that it had failed to provide 
proper notice within the two-year statutory window.12  Apple 
appealed one of the cases, In re Staats, to the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit (CAFC), and oral arguments were heard on 
September 8, 2011.13  The decision of the CAFC panel has the 
potential to become the most definitive statement in broadening 
reissue practice in almost twenty years, and will likely coincide with 
sweeping changes recently signed into law in the Leahy-Smith 
America Invents Act.14  
¶5 Part I of this article will review pertinent case law in the realm 
of reissue patent practice.  Part II will analyze the facts of the Staats 
case currently before the CAFC.  Part III will critically review the 
                                                
11 See, e.g., 59 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 1257–62 (1892) (summarizing Topliff and 
noting that claims could be broadened “provided it is evident that there has been 
a mistake and that the applicant has been guilty of no want of reasonable 
diligence in discovering it,” that there was a presumption that after two years 
from issuance anything not claimed had been “abandoned,” and further 
discussing the idea of undue delay and laches, all of which are at issue in 
Staats); see Part II, infra. 
12 Staats, No. 2009-007162, 2010 WL 1725728 (B.P.A.I. Apr. 26, 2010); In re 
Kelly, No. 2009-006496, 2010 WL 3454272 (B.P.A.I. Aug. 26, 2010); Ex parte 
Riddle, No. 2011-002276, 2011 WL 486246 (B.P.A.I. Feb. 10, 2011); Ex parte 
Riddle, No. 2011-002277, 2011 WL 486252 (B.P.A.I. Feb. 11, 2011); Ex parte 
Riddle, No. 2011-001749, 2011 WL 861732 (B.P.A.I. Mar. 10, 2011). 
13 Staats, No. 2009-007162, 2010 WL 1725728 (B.P.A.I. Apr. 26, 2010), appeal 
docketed, In re Staats, No. 2010-1443 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 4, 2010), argued, Oral 
Argument, In re Staats, No. 2010-1443 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 8, 2011) available at 
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-recordings/search/audio.html 
(search for “2010-1443” in the field “Appeal Number”). 
14 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. § 6, chs. 31–32 
(signed into law by President Obama on Sept. 16, 2011) (addressing post-grant 
review procedures). 
2011 DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW No. 009 
arguments presented by the parties in Staats to the CAFC, as well as 
larger public-policy themes relevant to resolution of the arguments.  
Finally, Part IV will offer concluding remarks, and explore the 
possible paths that the CAFC may take to reform broadening reissue 
patent practice. 
I. REISSUE JURISPRUDENCE 
“These provisions [concerning patent reissue practice] have often 
been before the courts and there are sharply differing views 
concerning them.”15 
¶6 The concept of patent reissue in the United States dates back 
nearly as far as the concept of the patent itself.  A reissue provision 
first appeared in the Patent Act of 1832,16 which Congress passed on 
July 3, 1832, largely in response to the Supreme Court case Grant v. 
Raymond,17 decided in January of the same year.  The relevant 
provision of the Patent Act of 1832 read  
[t]hat wherever any patent which has been heretofore, or shall be 
hereafter, granted to any inventor in pursuance of [the Patent Act of 
1793], or of any of the acts supplementary thereto, shall be invalid or 
inoperative, by reason that any of the terms or conditions prescribed in 
the third section of the said first mentioned act, have not, by 
inadvertence, accident, or mistake, and without any fraudulent or 
deceptive intention, been complied with on the part of the said 
inventor, it shall be lawful for the Secretary of State, upon the 
surrender to him of such patent, to cause a new patent to be granted to 
the said inventor for the same invention for the residue of the period 
then unexpired, for which the original patent was granted, upon his 
compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed in the said third 
section of the said act.18   
The general stipulations of this provision survive today,19 with minor 
changes in language and the formal codified addition of the two-year 
statutory period upon the passage of the Patent Act of 1952.20  
                                                
15 Sontag Chain Stores Co., Ltd. v. Nat’l Nut Co. of Cal., 310 U.S. 281, 284 
(1940). 
16 An Act Concerning Patents for Useful Inventions, ch. 162, 4 Stat. 559 (1832). 
17 31 U.S. 218 (1832).   
18 An Act Concerning Patents for Useful Inventions, ch. 162, 4 Stat. 559 (1832). 
19 Compare with 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2006):  
Whenever any patent is, through error without any deceptive intention, 
deemed wholly or partly inoperative or invalid, by reason of a defective 
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¶7 By the mid-nineteenth century, patentees were using—and 
abusing—the reissue statutes in the rapidly industrializing United 
States.  Abuse of reissue statutes led to the landmark decision in 
Miller v. Brass Co.,21 where the Supreme Court stated the problem as 
follows:  
[B]y a curious misapplication of the law [the reissue provision] has 
come to be principally resorted to for the purpose of enlarging and 
expanding patent claims.  And the evils which have grown from the 
practice have assumed large proportions.  Patents have been so 
expanded and idealized, years after their first issue, that hundreds and 
thousands of mechanics and manufactures, who had just reason to 
suppose that the field of action was open, have been obliged to 
discontinue their employments, or to pay an enormous tax for 
continuing them.22  
The Supreme Court reiterated that reissue was only available in the 
case of a mistake, and for the first time set the two-year deadline for 
broadening reissue.23  This two-year window was consistently 
recognized by courts from that point forward, and it was formally 
written into the Patent Act upon its retooling in 1952.24  Miller v. 
                                                                                                         
specification or drawing, or by reason of the patentee claiming more or 
less than he had a right to claim in the patent, the Director shall, on the 
surrender of such patent and the payment of the fee required by law, 
reissue the patent for the invention disclosed in the original patent, and in 
accordance with a new and amended application, for the unexpired part of 
the term of the original patent.  No new matter shall be introduced into the 
application for reissue. 
20 Patent Act of July 19, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792 (1952) (codified 
as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–318 (2006) (“No reissued patent shall be granted 
enlarging the scope of the claims of the original patent unless applied for within 
two years from the grant of the original patent.”).  As discussed infra, this 
statute was merely the codification of a common law rule that had been in use 
for decades. 
21 104 U.S. 350 (1881). 
22 Id. at 355. 
23 Id. at 352 (“If two years’ public enjoyment of an invention with the consent 
and allowance of the inventor is evidence of abandonment, and a bar to an 
application for a patent, a public disclaimer in the patent itself should be 
construed equally favorable to the public.”). 
24 See LADAS & PERRY, LLP, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE PATENT LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES n.37, http://www.ladas.com/Patents/USPatentHistory_fn.html 
(last updated July 17, 2009) (“When the code was established prior laws had 
been compiled into it but nor [sic] re-enacted.  Subsequently it was felt desirable 
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Brass Co. (also known as Bridgeport Brass) has been cited thirty-
seven times by the Supreme Court since 1882 and remains good law 
today.  An example of the consistent application of the two-year 
window can be seen in In re Otto, a 1919 decision from the Court of 
Appeals of the District of Columbia.25  The court noted: “We must 
now regard the law as well settled by the Supreme Court of the 
United States that, after the lapse of two years after the issue of a 
patent, a reissue which seeks to enlarge the claims of the original 
patent will not be granted.”26  The court went on to state that 
exceptions were possible, but diligence would certainly be required.27  
¶8 Other alterations and expansions of the reissue privilege have 
been comparatively recent.28  An important decision came from the 
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in the 1970 case In re Doll.29  
The USPTO issued the patent in question with nineteen claims on 
December 20, 1955.  A reissue application containing twelve 
additional, broadened claims for the purpose of provoking an 
interference was properly filed on October 31, 1957—one year and 
ten months after the initial issue.30  But during further ex parte 
proceedings and a second interference, the patentees added and 
amended additional claims as late as October 16, 1962, nearly seven 
years after issue.31  The USPTO rejected the claims that were added 
outside the two-year period, stating they were time-barred by 35 
U.S.C. § 251, and the rejection was upheld by the Patent Office 
Board of Appeals.32  The patentee appealed, arguing that the plain 
                                                                                                         
to clean up and re-enact each title of the code as positive law.  In 1952 it was 
patents [sic] turn.”). 
25 259 F. 985 (D.C. Cir. 1919). 
26 Id. at 986 (quoting In re Starkey, 21 App. D.C. 519, 525 (D.C. Cir. 1903)). 
27 Id.  
28 This article chiefly focuses on the major cases of the last forty years.  For a 
detailed summary of the evolution of reissue jurisprudence prior to the 1970s, 
see Federico, supra note 10, at 605–24. 
29 419 F.2d 925 (C.C.P.A. 1970).  The CCPA was the direct predecessor court of 
the CAFC. The CAFC was created in 1982.  See History of the Court, THE FED. 
CIRCUIT HISTORICAL SOC’Y, 
http://www.federalcircuithistoricalsociety.org/historyofcourt.html (last visited 
Nov. 3, 2011). 
30 In re Doll, 419 F.2d at 926. 
31 Id.  
32 Id.  The Patent Office Board of Appeals was the predecessor tribunal at the 
USPTO to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences.  Under the Leahy-
Smith America Invents Act, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences will 
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language of the statute “unless applied for within two years from the 
grant of the original patent”33 meant exactly that: the application for 
reissue patent merely needed to be applied for within the two years, 
with the right to tinker thereafter with its scope preserved.34  The 
court looked to the legislative history of the 1952 Patent Act, and in 
vacating the Board of Appeals’ decision, was “unable to ascertain . . . 
any intent similar to the interpretation placed on section 251 by the 
board.  To the contrary, it appears clear that the language ‘applied 
for’ refers to filing of an application.”35  The government argued that 
the “rights of the public” demanded the rejection of the expanded 
claims, but the court disagreed, stating that it was unnecessary to 
even reach the issue due to the plain-meaning interpretation of section 
251.36  The court did note, however, that “35 U.S.C. 252 provides 
safeguards for the public by virtue of its intervening rights 
provisions.”37 
¶9 Later decisions have further defined the softer contours of the 
blunt two-year restriction.  In In re Fotland,38 the CAFC affirmed the 
rejection of broadened claims introduced outside the two-year 
window when an application had been filed within two years.39  The 
reissue application in question, however, was a so-called “no defect” 
reissue application filed under 37 C.F.R. § 1.175(a)(4).40  During 
                                                                                                         
be replaced by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board effective September 16, 2012.  
See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. § 3(j) (signed 
into law by President Obama on Sept. 16, 2011) (renaming tribunal due to 
elimination of interference proceedings). 
33 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1966). 
34 Doll, 419 F.2d at 926–27. 
35 Id. at 928. 
36 Id. 
37 Id.  
38 779 F.2d 31 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
39 Id. at 32. 
40 Id.  37 C.F.R. § 1.175(a)(4) was repealed in 1982 as it was deemed to be 
redundant to the then-newly instituted ex parte reexamination process.  See id. at 
32 n.1 (citing 47 Fed. Reg. 21746, 21748–49, 21752 (May 19, 1982)).  The 
provision in effect at the time of the events of Fotland read as follows: 
(4) When the applicant is aware of prior art or other information relevant 
to patentability, not previously considered by the Office, which might 
cause the examiner to deem the original patent wholly or partly 
inoperative or invalid, particularly specifying such prior art or other 
information and requesting that if the examiner so deems, the applicant be 
permitted to amend the patent and be granted a reissue patent. 
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prosecution of the reissue application, the examiner deemed that there 
was no impact on the patent by the new references and rejected the 
application for reissue.41  The reissue applicants responded, then two 
years and three months after issue, by amending the claims and 
attempting to convert the reissue application to one under a different 
regulation that would have allowed broadening.42  The USPTO and 
the Board rejected the reissue claim amendments as being made 
outside the permissible two-year window.  The applicants appealed to 
the CAFC, urging that a reissue application had been filed within two 
years of patent grant.43  The CAFC affirmed, however, stating that 
Doll authorized later broadening only when a broadening reissue was 
filed within two years; a “no defect” reissue was not within the 
purview of the plain language of the statute.44 
¶10 Two cases in the next decade affirmed both Fotland and Doll, 
and provided more detail with regard to when broadening reissue 
applications were permissible.  First, a Board decision in Buell v. 
Beckestrom held that divisional reissue applications that broadened 
claims outside the two-year window were permissible under 35 
U.S.C. § 251, so long as an intervening reissue that demonstrated 
intent to broaden was filed within the two-year period.45  Second, the 
CAFC later affirmed in In re Graff that both divisional and 
continuation reissues could include broadened claims more than two 
years after issuance, if, as in Buell, patentees filed a proper 
parent-broadening reissue application within two years of patent 
grant.46  The particular reissue application in Graff, however, was 
held insufficient because the parent reissue application only sought to 
correct an error in a figure, not to broaden the claims.47  The Graff 
court particularly focused on public notice:  
                                                                                                         
 
37 C.F.R. § 1.175(a)(4) (1980).  The provision essentially allowed a patent 
holder who found new prior art relevant to the invention post-issue to bring it to 
the USPTO and obtain re-review of the claims without amending the claims or 
the specification.  See Robert W. Fieseler, Note, Staying Litigation Pending 
Reexamination of Patents, 14 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 279, 285 (1983).  
41 Fotland, 779 F.2d at 32–33. 
42 Id. at 33. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 34. 
45 22 U.S.P.Q.2d 1128, 1130 (B.P.A.I. 1992). 
46 111 F.3d 874, 876–77 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
47 Id. at 877 (citing Fotland). 
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The reissue statute balances the purpose of providing the patentee with 
an opportunity to correct errors of inadequate claim scope, with the 
public interest in finality and certainty of patent rights . . . . The 
interested public is entitled to rely on the absence of a broadening 
reissue application within two years of grant of the original patent.48 
¶11 In summary, if and only if a patentee properly files a 
broadening reissue application, based on an “error” within two years 
of patent issuance, would further broadening be possible for 
later-filed reissue applications claiming priority from an original 
(parent) reissue application.  It is critical to note that an “error” under 
§ 251 has also developed a standard definition in the case law—
surrendering claims during prosecution of the application which led 
to an issued patent in order to gain allowance of other claims is not an 
“error” that justifies a reissue.49  An attempt to pursue previously 
surrendered claims via reissue is known as “recapture,” which is 
generally not permitted to any real extent, is described in the MPEP, 
and was most recently discussed by the CAFC in In re 
Mostafazadeh.50  There were few other ripples in the pool of reissue 
jurisprudence until the landmark year of 2010.  
II. MULTIPLE BITES FROM “THE APPLE”—KELLY, RIDDLE,  
AND STAATS 
¶12 A new dimension has evolved in the doctrine of broadening 
reissue over the last two years, begging a new question: what if a 
patentee properly files a broadening reissue application within the 
two-year window, but then attempts to broaden again, in a different 
manner from the original reissue application, via one or more 
continuation reissue applications filed outside the two-year window?  
This question arose from five rejected reissue applications directed 
towards computer-system architecture from Apple Computer, Inc. in 
2010–2011.  Ex parte Kelly,51 Ex parte Staats,52 and three different 
                                                
48 Id. 
49 Ex parte Pagilagan, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d 1629, 1633 (B.P.A.I. 2002). 
50 See MPEP § 1412.02; see also In re Mostafazadeh, 643 F.3d 1353, 1358 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011).  The Mostafazadeh court held that a claim could be broadened in a 
reissue to incorporate surrendered subject matter if the claim is also materially 
narrowed with respect to the surrendered subject matter.   
51 No. 2009-006496, 2010 WL 3454272 (B.P.A.I. Aug. 26, 2010). 
52 No. 2009-007162, 2010 WL 1725728 (B.P.A.I. Apr. 26, 2010). 
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rejected reissue applications in Ex parte Riddle,53 involved 
broadening reissue applications filed by Apple and rejected by 
various USPTO examiners under 35 U.S.C. § 251 for improper 
broadening outside the two-year window. 
¶13 The facts of each case were essentially identical and were 
treated as such by the Board.54  The Board did not dispute that Apple 
properly filed a broadening reissue application within the two-year 
statutory period, or that proper continuation reissue applications were 
later filed.55  In all cases, Apple acknowledged filing all of the 
relevant rejected reissue applications (in some cases, as in Staats, the 
second or third continuation reissue claiming priority to the original, 
“qualifying” reissue application)56 “to broaden the claims in different 
ways.”57  The examiners in each case rejected the claims as 
impermissible attempts to broaden because the entirely different 
manner of broadening proposed in the latest reissue applications 
would deny the public sufficient notice.58  Apple appealed each case 
and argued that while “an intent to broaden” must certainly be shown 
within the two-year period—and in each case, was shown—the 
“eventual scope” of the initial broadening need not be fully laid out in 
that first reissue application filing inside the two-year period.59  
Because the public was duly notified of “any intent” to broaden 
within two years of patent issuance, earlier case law such as Doll 
                                                
53 Ex parte Riddle, No. 2011-002276, 2011 WL 486246 (B.P.A.I. Feb. 10, 
2011); Ex parte Riddle, No. 2011-002277, 2011 WL 486252 (B.P.A.I. Feb. 11, 
2011); Ex parte Riddle, No. 2011-001749, 2011 WL 861732 (B.P.A.I. Mar. 10, 
2011). 
54 See, e.g., Kelly, No. 2009-006496, 2010 WL 3454272, at *1 (“Since the 
present application pertains to substantially the same issue of law as in Staats, 
the reasoning in Staats applies largely to the issue before us in this appeal.”). 
55 See, e.g., Staats, No. 2009-007162, 2010 WL 1725728, at *2 (“The Examiner 
found that the present reissue application impermissibly broadens the patented 
claims beyond two years from the original patent’s issuance.  The Examiner 
assumed that the present application is a proper continuation application . . . 
[and] that Appellants indicated an intent to broaden the patented claims within 
two years.”) (citations omitted). 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
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should permit any broadening in a later—and properly filed—
continuation or divisional reissue application.60  
¶14 Thus, Apple appealed a fairly concrete issue to the Board: 
“whether a continuing reissue application can broaden patented 
claims beyond the two-year statutory period in a manner unrelated to 
the broadening aspect that was identified within the two-year 
period.”61 As the Board admitted, “[t]his is a case of first 
impression.”62  The Board first looked to the statute and the case law, 
and noted the holding of Graff in particular, which neatly presented 
the issue of adequate public notice by stating that the “public is 
entitled to rely on the absence of a broadening reissue application 
within two years of grant of the original patent.”63  Here, though, 
there was a relevant broadening reissue within two years—it was just 
intended to broaden a different aspect of the patent claims than that 
addressed in the rejected second reissue application.  Apple’s patent 
at issue in Staats64 contained claims directed to two embodiments.65  
The original reissue application, properly filed on the two-year 
anniversary of issue, sought to broaden claims directed to one 
embodiment.  The claims in the rejected continuation reissue 
application, filed some six years later, sought to broaden claims 
directed to the other embodiment.66  Apple was forthcoming about 
this fact, conceding it “absolutely” during oral argument before the 
Board.67 
¶15 In the end, the Board affirmed the USPTO and rejected all of 
the broadened claims in the continuation reissue applications.68  
                                                
60 See id. (“According to Appellants, so long as the public is notified 
of any intent to broaden within two years, it is unnecessary to notify the public 
of the specific scope of broadening within that time period.”) (emphasis in 
original). 
61 Id. at *3. 
62 Id. at *7. 
63 Id. (quoting In re Graff, 111 F.3d 874, 877 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). 
64 U.S. Patent No. 5,940,600 (filed Apr. 1, 1996) (issued Aug. 17, 1999). 
65 Staats, No. 2009-007162, 2010 WL 1725728, at *7–8. 
66 Id. at *8. 
67 See id. at *8 nn.10–11.  When asked by Administrative Patent Judge Jeffery 
whether the original broadening declaration was to a different embodiment than 
the present application and whether “no one could have foreseen” the second 
broadening based on the original declaration, Apple’s counsel responded 
“Absolutely” to both questions. 
68 See, e.g., id. at *15 (“For the foregoing reasons, Appellants have not 
persuaded us of error in the Examiner’s rejection of claims 12–32 under 35 
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Stating that such unforeseeable broadening would “run[] counter to 
the public notice function underpinning § 251,” the Board refused to 
allow the continuing reissue application in Staats because “[t]o hold 
otherwise would effectively give Appellants a license to 
unforeseeably shift from one invention to another via reissue well 
beyond the two-year statutory period.”69  The Board soundly rejected 
Apple’s assertions that Doll, Graff, and even the MPEP permitted 
their actions.70  The Board distinguished Doll and Graff because the 
broadening in those cases was directed toward the same embodiment, 
whereas, in the present case, multiple embodiments were at issue.71 
¶16 Apple’s MPEP-based arguments are worth noting.  Apple 
cited MPEP § 1412.03(IV) in its brief: “Where any intent to broaden 
is indicated in the reissue application within the two years from the 
patent grant, a broadened claim can subsequently be presented in the 
reissue after the two year period.”72  On appeal, the Board conceded 
that this passage of the MPEP seemed to indicate via “ambiguous 
expansive” language that the second broadening might be 
allowable.73  But the Board noted that the July 2008 revision to the 
MPEP made an important change to this provision—it inserted the 
word “unequivocally” between “is” and “indicated.”74  The provision 
now reads “[w]here any intent to broaden is unequivocally indicated 
in the reissue application within the two years from the patent grant, a 
broadened claim can subsequently be presented in the reissue after 
the two year period.”75  One is left to wonder, however, whether 
Apple reasonably could have anticipated this new qualifying 
provision in the language of the MPEP.  Curiously, Apple did not 
challenge this discrepancy, neither in its briefs nor at oral argument at 
any level of the appeals. 
¶17 The Board finally rejected Apple’s claims in Staats in 
November 2007—almost eight months before the July 2008 MPEP 
                                                                                                         
U.S.C. § 251.  Therefore, we will sustain the Examiner’s rejection of those 
claims.”) 
69 Id. at *9. 
70 See id. at *9–13. 
71 Id. at *10. 
72 Id. at *11 & n.20. 
73 Id. at *11. 
74 Id. (citing MPEP § 1412.03 (8th ed. Rev. 7, July 2008)). 
75 Id. 
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revision came into effect.76  Moreover, the claim rejections in Kelly 
also occurred before the MPEP revision;77 and the rejections in 
Riddle would have taken place after the revision.78  Nevertheless, the 
Board believed that the public-notice function of 35 U.S.C. § 251 
trumped the MPEP taken alone.79 
¶18 The Board decided the Kelly and Riddle cases after Staats, 
applying virtually identical reasoning given the virtually identical 
facts of the interrelated appeals.  Apple appealed the Staats decision 
to the Federal Circuit on June 24, 2010, soon after the release of the 
Board opinion on April 26, 2010.80  The parties completed briefing in 
April 2011,81 and the CAFC heard oral arguments on September 8, 
2011.82 
III. STAATS—“OVERLY BROAD”? 
¶19 The Staats case presents a collision between two robust 
statutory interpretations and two equally weighty sets of policy 
considerations.  On the one hand, the public-notice function cited by 
both the USPTO and the Board, and regarded as a hallmark of the 
                                                
76 Id. at *6. 
77 In re Kelly, No. 2009-006496, 2010 WL 3454272, at *6 (B.P.A.I. Aug. 26, 
2010) (final rejection mailed Nov. 2007). 
78 See, e.g., Ex parte Riddle, No. 2011-002276, 2011 WL 486246, at *7 
(B.P.A.I. Feb. 10, 2011) (final rejection mailed Dec. 2009). 
79 Staats, No. 2009-007162, 2010 WL 1725728, at *11 (“But even assuming, 
without deciding, that this is the case, we still are unconvinced that the law 
permits broadening in a completely unforeseeable manner after two years as 
Appellants have done here, particularly when considering the MPEP together 
with the reissue statute and its crucial public notice function.” (emphasis in 
original)). 
80 Petition for Review, In re Staats, No. 2010-1443 (Fed. Cir. June 24, 2010) 
(accessed on the USTPO Public PAIR system at 
http://portal.uspto.gov/external/portal/pair under application number 
11/503,541). 
81 See Brief of Appellant-Petitioner, In re Staats, No. 2010-1443 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 
16, 2010), 2010 U.S. Fed. Cir. Briefs LEXIS 1111; Brief of Appellee-
Respondent, In re Staats, No. 2010-1443 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 21, 2011), 2011 U.S. 
Fed. Cir. Briefs LEXIS 327; Reply Brief of Appellant-Petitioner, In re Staats, 
No. 2010-1443 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 18, 2011), 2011 U.S. Fed. Cir. Briefs LEXIS 403. 
82 Oral Argument, In re Staats, No. 2010-1443 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 8, 2011), 
available at http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-
recordings/search/audio.html (search for “2010-1443” in the field “Appeal 
Number”). 
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protections in 35 U.S.C. § 251, is crucial.83  The public has the right 
to know what is claimed and disclaimed in a patent, and patentees 
should not be able to reshape their inventions throughout the life of 
the patent simply by lodging a “placeholder” broadening reissue 
application within two years of patent issuance, from which any 
number of potentially disparate continuing reissue applications could 
be filed.  Allowing such activity without adequate safeguards could 
result in a scenario in which a competitor could spend millions, 
perhaps billions, of dollars based on knowledge of the bounds of the 
limited monopoly granted by a particular patent, only to face an 
infringement action years later after the boundaries of the limited 
monopoly have shifted.     
¶20 Abuse of reissue practice, particularly in the context of 
continuation reissue applications, is nothing new.  Testimony before 
Congress in 1878 during consideration of Patent Act amendments 
reflected the serious concern of members of Congress and members 
of the patent bar regarding the potential for misconduct: “Scratch a 
reissue and you will find a fraud.  In nine cases out of ten you will 
find a fraud upon the law, and in every instance a fraud in fact.”84  
These doomsday visions are akin to the parade of horribles frequently 
presented in arguments against “submarine”-type patents, so called 
because they surface after years submerged in prosecution pendency 
to “torpedo” mature industries and collect rents.85  The chilling effect 
                                                
83 See generally Michael Risch, The Failure of Public Notice in Patent 
Prosecution, 21 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 179, 180 (2007) (noting that, at the 
expense of the public, neither patent applicants nor patent examiners have 
incentives in the present iteration of the U.S. patent prosecution system to create 
certain, definite claims); see also Gary C. Ganzi, Note, Patent Continuation 
Practice and Public Notice: Can They Coexist?, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
SOC’Y 545, 592 (2007) (describing the tension between continuation practice 
and public notice, the major problem of abuse, and the undesirable ripple effects 
of potential solutions); see also J. Christopher Carraway, The Uncertain Future 
of Enforcing Patents that Have Been Broadened Through Reissue, 8 FED. CIR. 
B. J. 63, 70–75 (1998) (outlining the policy conflict between permitting 
broadening reissue for correction of errors in patent prosecution versus the need 
for public notice). 
84 ARGUMENTS BEFORE THE COMM. ON PATENTS OF THE S. AND H.R., S. MISC. 
DOC. NO. 45-50, at 362 (2d Sess. 1878) (statement of George Payson, Gen. 
Counsel, Western R.R. Ass’n); see also Federico, supra note 10, at 610. 
85 See generally, Timothy R. DeWitt, Does Supreme Court Precedent Sink 
Submarine Patents?, 38 IDEA 601 (1998) (citing Miller v. Brass Co., 104 U.S. 
350 (1881)) (outlining the dangers presented by patents that enlarge their scope 
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that such a similar system of ever-shifting scope through reissue 
applications would have on innovation is indisputable.  With the 
possibility of ramping up R&D only to shut it down at or before 
production when a broadening reissue application changes the 
landscape, industry actors would experience a stifling effect from 
unbridled broadening reissue applications that would disrupt the 
market at large. 
¶21 On the other hand, as argued by Apple in the Staats appeal to 
the Board, the CAFC in Doll held that the intervening rights provided 
by 35 U.S.C. § 252 are potentially sufficient to counterbalance the 
damage to public notice done by broadening reissues.86  That is, there 
is a clear quid pro quo—in exchange for a reissued patent, the 
patentee must “surrender” the original patent.87  Furthermore, given 
the recent transparency in publication and prosecution practice for 
pending applications and reissue applications at the USPTO, 
applicants already surrender a great deal of secrecy before issuance of 
a patent or reissue patent.  Any broadening reissue patent would of 
course still have to be supported by its specification or other claims, 
which could have effectively been part of public knowledge for years 
                                                                                                         
“many years” after issuance).  See also Federico, supra note 10, at 636–637 
(discussing in passing the concept of presenting “dominating” claims “sometime 
after the application has been filed” in the context of intervening rights, and 
calling for further study in the context of reissue patents).   
86 See In re Staats, No. 2009-007162, 2010 WL 1725728, at *9–10; see also In 
re Doll, 419 F.2d 925, 928 (C.C.P.A. 1970).  35 U.S.C. § 252 (2006) states  
[a] reissued patent shall not abridge or affect the right of any person or 
that person’s successors in business who, prior to the grant of a reissue, 
made, purchased, offered to sell, or used within the United States, or 
imported into the United States, anything patented by the reissued patent, 
to continue the use of, to offer to sell, or to sell to others to be used, 
offered for sale, or sold, the specific thing so made, purchased, offered for 
sale, used, or imported unless the making, using, offering for sale, or 
selling of such thing infringes a valid claim of the reissued patent which 
was in the original patent. 
87 See 35 U.S.C. § 252 (2006) (“The surrender of the original patent shall take 
effect upon the issue of the reissued patent.”).  “Surrender” in this context no 
longer means a physical surrender of the letters patent; this requirement was 
removed from the patent rules in 2004.  See Changes To Support 
Implementation of the United States Patent and Trademark Office 21st Century 
Strategic Plan, 69 Fed. Reg. 56,482–01 (Sept. 21, 2004) (codified at 37 C.F.R. 
§ 1.178 (2010)).  The reissue patent automatically replaces the original patent in 
terms of property right at the time that the reissue patent is granted.   
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before the broadening.  Therefore, one can argue that nothing would 
serve to hamper a competitor from developing a competing and 
noninfringing product with improvements in the years it would 
undoubtedly take for the USPTO to wade through applications, 
reissues, and continuations of those reissues.88   
¶22 The CAFC will need to tackle a number of outstanding issues 
in their consideration of the Staats appeal.  For example, in 
considering broadening reissue applications, their publication, and 
their effect on competition, the court will need to define what is a 
“reasonable” delay for the purposes of bringing broadened reissue 
claims to the table.  Given the language of the Board decision, the 
court must consider what is “foreseeable.”  Finally, the court will 
need to draw a clear line in the sand with regard to whether a patent 
claim’s scope will be facially obvious from the original disclosure, or 
if future “tweaks” will be permissible. 
A. Apple’s Opening Brief 
¶23 The parties’ briefs provided a fascinating preview of the 
arguments they brought before the CAFC panel on September 8, 
2011.  For example, in its opening brief, Apple stated that, forty years 
ago, Doll established that as long as a broadening reissue is on file 
within the statutory two-year period, claims can be further broadened 
after that two-year period.89  As reinforced over the years by Fotland, 
Graff, and the MPEP, this initial public notice within two years of 
patent issuance should adequately balance the needs of patentees and 
the public.90  The public-notice policy rationale was the chief force 
behind the Board’s decision—but the CAFC and its predecessor court 
had rejected that rationale many times before.91  Apple argued that 
Doll and its progeny are still good law, and are binding on the CAFC 
and the USPTO.92  Furthermore, the USPTO has retained the “any 
                                                
88 But see Ganzi, supra note 83, at 594–95 (arguing that new publication regimes 
actually serve to undermine public notice by complicating intervening rights 
remedies). 
89 Brief of Appellant-Petitioner, In re Staats, No. 2010-1443 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 16, 
2010), 2010 U.S. Fed. Cir. Briefs LEXIS 1111, at *9–11. 
90 Id. at *11 (quoting In re Graff, 111 F.3d 874, 877 (Fed. Cir. 1997)) (35 U.S.C. 
§ 251 “balances the purpose of providing the patentee with an opportunity to 
correct errors of inadequate claim scope, with the public interest in finality and 
certainty.”). 
91 Id. at *26–27. 
92 Id. at *32–34. 
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intent to broaden” language in the MPEP as being sufficient for 
decades,93 so a decision against Apple on appeal would overturn that 
precedent.94  
¶24 Another compelling argument in Apple’s opening brief was 
that the “embodiment” restriction imposed by the Board constituted 
an “extra-statutory limitation,” which the CAFC has consistently 
ruled impermissible.95  After documenting a number of cases in 
which extra requirements on reissue applicants were rejected,96 Apple 
declares that this scenario is anything but “a case of first 
impression.”97  According to Apple, the Board’s allusion to 
prosecution laches is also misplaced and irrelevant, as six years 
should not be deemed an “unreasonable” delay, assuming the 
applicant demonstrated unequivocal intent to broaden in a broadening 
reissue application filing within two years of patent issuance, and 
prosecution of reissue application(s) was diligent during that time.98   
¶25 It would thus appear that in order to rule against Apple, the 
CAFC would have to expressly overrule Doll and Graff, or abrogate 
them substantially.  Apple concluded its opening brief by addressing 
the public-notice policy concerns: to the extent that such a policy 
would be relevant, any panic is overblown.  The public has plenty of 
notice via other existing mechanisms, such as publication and 
transparency of reissue prosecution, and intervening rights potentially 
would be available.  Inventors’ rights must also be taken into account, 
                                                
93 But, practitioners have recently been receiving USPTO rejections on 
continuation reissue applications implicitly based on the reasoning in Staats.  
Consequently, the “any intent” language appears to be marginalized at the 
USPTO at present, pending the decision at the Federal Circuit. 
94 Id. at *34–37. 
95 Id. at *40–41. 
96 Id. at *41–45 (citing Graff, 111 F.3d at 876–77 (precluding multiple reissue 
patents was “beyond the strictures” of § 251 because the plain language of the 
statute contained no such limit); In re Amos, 953 F.2d 613 (Fed. Cir. 1991) 
(rejecting an “intent to claim” requirement); In re Doyle, 293 F.3d 1355, 1363 
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (rejecting the preclusion of linking claims in a broadening 
reissue); In re Bauman, 683 F.2d 405, 407 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (rejecting a rule 
prohibiting regular utility applications from claiming the benefit of reissue 
applications for filing date purposes as being extra-statutory to 35 U.S.C. § 120); 
In re Doll, 419 F.2d 925, 928 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (ruling the requirement that each 
broadening claim be asserted within the two-year window rather than a 
broadening application was extra-statutory)). 
97 Id. at *43. 
98 Id. at *49. 
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and they should not be required up front to show all their cards at 
once when so much is at stake.99 
¶26 From the perspective of owners of intellectual property and 
many patent practitioners who represent large corporate clients, 
Apple’s argument appears on its face to be quite compelling.  As the 
USPTO prosecution process has become ever more transparent (and 
unfortunately, ever more backlogged), the public has plenty of time to 
gain notice of what pending applications intend to claim.  Companies 
can still pay a fee to hide pending applications from public view by 
requesting nonpublication,100 but doing so raises transaction costs and 
also sacrifices some rights to the nonpublished invention in overseas 
markets.101  The public can readily view the USPTO’s Public PAIR102 
database to find detailed and up-to-date information on any pending, 
published application.  Other user-friendly services such as Google® 
Patents103 and IP.com104 also make searching patents and even 
creating active alert functions accessible at little or no cost. The 
variety in access points for this publicly available information 
weakens the Board’s reliance on a public notice policy rationale. 
B. The Government’s Opening Brief 
¶27 By contrast, the government’s opening brief is heavy with 
historical and policy appeals, and understandably reinforces much of 
the language of the Board’s decision.  The government observed, as 
did the Board, that the statutory two-year limit is merely the 
codification of the equitable doctrine of laches applied to broadening 
                                                
99 Id. at *66–74. 
100 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.213(a) (2010) (“If the invention disclosed in an application 
has not been and will not be the subject of an application filed in another 
country, or under a multilateral international agreement, that requires 
publication of applications eighteen months after filing, the application will not 
be published,” provided certain formalities are met.). 
101 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.213(a), (c).  Failure to notify USPTO of subsequent filing 
in an international jurisdiction that requires publication will result in 
abandonment of the application in the United States. 
102 UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT APPLICATION 
INFORMATION RETRIEVAL, http://portal.uspto.gov/external/portal/pair (last 
visited Sept. 20, 2011). 
103 http://www.google.com/patents (last visited Sept. 20, 2011). 
104 http://www.ip.com (last visited Sept. 20, 2011). 
2011 DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW No. 009 
reissues.105  This tradition dates back to Miller v. Brass Co. and 
beyond, and clearly reflects the undisturbed intent of the Supreme 
Court.106  The government then pointed to counsel’s admissions at 
oral argument that Apple’s broadening was directed to a different 
embodiment and that the broadening was thus not foreseen as 
evidence that Apple’s reliance on Doll, Graff, and the MPEP were 
misplaced.107  Allowing the Staats claims would not break from 
precedent as Apple asserts but instead would blaze significant new 
ground, because all relevant broadening reissues in Doll and Graff 
were directed at all times to the same embodiment, and thus the 
public at all times had notice of the nature of the broadening.108   
¶28 Looking back to the legislative history of the 1952 Patent Act, 
where §§ 251–252 were added largely in their present form, the 
government maintained that the two-year notice window and the 
intervening-rights provisions were added for different reasons.109  
Consequently, intervening rights cannot be a compelling enough 
safeguard to override the superior interests of the public.110  In 
closing, the government stated that when read as a whole, the Patent 
Act would not permit Apple’s actions—to do so would open the door 
for the worst-case scenario of placeholder, submarine-type reissue 
patents for which claim scope could be altered throughout the entire 
patent term.111 
C. Apple’s Reply Brief 
¶29 Finally, in its reply brief, Apple essentially reiterated the 
points in its opening brief, but noted again that historical allusions to 
cases such as Bridgeport Brass were inapposite because that era 
preceded a time when there were clear statutory bounds for 
                                                
105 Brief of Appellee-Respondent, In re Staats, No. 2010-1443 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 
21, 2011), 2011 U.S. Fed. Cir. Briefs LEXIS 327, at *11. 
106 Id. at *11–13 (citing Miller v. Brass Co., 104 U.S. 350, 355 (1881)). 
107 Id. at *12–15. 
108 See id. at *17–18. 
109 Id. at *50 (citing Seattle Box Co., Inc. v. Indus. Crating & Packing Inc., 756 
F.2d 1574, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).  Federico’s Commentary on the New Patent 
Act set aside the intervening rights of § 252 as a personal defense to patent 
infringement for particular users who began use before the reissue was granted; 
§ 251 rights are for the public at large. 
110 Id. at *50–51. 
111 Id. at *61–63. 
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broadening reissues.112  The policy arguments of the government 
simply did not justify an extra-statutory limitation.113  Apple also 
appealed to judicial efficiency, stating that the new USPTO rule 
arising from Staats would create a “new, confusing, and endlessly 
litigable ground for challenging reissue patents in district court.”114  
Courts would be forced to navigate what even the USPTO admitted 
was a “fact-intensive inquiry” into relatedness between a patent and 
subsequent reissue patent applications.115 
D. Oral Argument 
¶30 The compelling arguments and skilled briefing by both parties 
set the stage for oral argument on September 8, 2011.  The panel, 
comprised of Judges Dyk, O’Malley, and Reyna,116 quickly asked 
questions focusing on an interpretation of USPTO rules and prior 
court precedent.  After Apple’s counsel John M. Whealan opened by 
stating that the proposed USPTO rule would go against the court’s 
prior holdings in Doll, Fotland, and Graff, Judge Dyk immediately 
asked, “Were those cases correctly decided?”117  Whealan responded 
in the affirmative.118  Judge Dyk later asked USPTO Associate 
Solicitor William Lamarca a similar question: “Doesn’t your 
argument lead you to say that Doll was wrongly decided?”119  When 
Lamarca demurred, stating, “Doll is precedent . . . . [W]e understand 
that,”120 Judge Dyk asked again, “Do you believe Doll was correctly 
decided?”121  Lamarca responded, “I personally think Doll could have 
been decided more strictly . . . . [T]he PTO understands that it’s 
precedent . . . . [I]f it was 1971 right now and we were arguing about 
the Doll situation, I, as a PTO representative, would have argued 
                                                
112 Reply Brief of Appellant-Petitioner, In re Staats, No. 2010-1443 (Fed. Cir. 
Apr. 18, 2011), 2011 U.S. Fed. Cir. Briefs LEXIS 403, at *17–20. 
113 Id. at *35–40. 
114 Id. at *39–40. 
115 Id. at *38. 
116 Senior Judge Clevenger was on the panel for all other cases heard on 
September 8, 2011, but apparently recused himself for the Staats hearing. 
117 Oral Argument at 1:46, In re Staats, No. 2010-1443 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 8, 2011), 
available at http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-
recordings/search/audio.html (search for “2010-1443” in the field “Appeal 
Number”). 
118 Id. at 1:48. 
119 Id. at 20:26. 
120 Id. at 20:32. 
121 Id. at 20:39. 
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against it being decided that way.  But the PTO lost that argument.  
We lost.  And we accept that.”122  Judge Dyk’s persistent interest in 
whether the C.C.P.A. wrongly decided Doll seems to suggest that 
Doll is critically relevant in this case and the resolution of this case 
might include some reevaluation of Doll’s precedential value. 
¶31 The early Supreme Court decisions relating to broadening 
reissue applications, including Miller v. Brass Co.,123 Sontag Chain 
Stores Co., Ltd. v. National Nut Co. of California,124 and Webster 
Electric Co. v. Splitdorf Electric Co.,125 were also pertinent to the 
discussion.  One of the most heated exchanges of the argument arose 
in response to a question posed by Judge Dyk to Apple counsel John 
M. Whealan.  In reference to the older precedent, Judge Dyk asked 
whether Apple’s proposed rule would hypothetically be permissible 
under those cases, and if it would have constituted laches.126  For the 
next several minutes, Judge Dyk and Mr. Whealan sparred over the 
answer, with Whealan refusing to concede that the posed hypothetical 
was even valid, and Judge Dyk becoming increasingly frustrated.  
Judge Dyk finally concluded, “You can’t answer my question,”127 
and “you’re agreeing that under the Miller Brass regime this would 
not have been permissible.”128   
¶32 Judge Dyk also sparred with Lamarca on the old cases, 
stating: “I find it very difficult to find in those earlier Supreme Court 
cases any support whatsoever for the distinction the Board made 
                                                
122 Id. at 20:42. 
123 104 U.S. 350 (1881). 
124 310 U.S. 281 (1940). 
125 264 U.S. 463 (1924).  Webster Elec. Co. was the chief foundation of the 
“laches” reasoning in the Board decision.  See Ex parte Staats, No. 2009-
007162, 2010 WL 1725728, at *13–14.  In Webster, the Supreme Court held 
that a patentee applying for a broadening reissue eight years after the initial 
patent had issued had resulted in “a case of unreasonable delay and neglect on 
the part of the applicant and his assignee in bringing forward claims broader 
than those originally sought.”  Webster, 264 U.S. at 465–66. 
126 Oral Argument, supra note 117, at 12:03. 
127 Id. at 13:47. 
128 Id. at 14:08.  This exchange would not be the last time Judge Dyk and Mr. 
Whealan would be at loggerheads in the course of the oral argument.  During 
rebuttal, when Whealan was discussing how the advent of intervening rights has 
made more liberal broadening reissue practice possible, Judge Dyk countered, 
“But those intervening rights are pretty limited.”  Id. at 32:07.  Whealan 
immediately interrupted, “That’s not true, Your Honor!” and Judge Dyk 
responded, “Don’t interrupt me.”  Id. at 32:13.   
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here.”129  Lamarca responded that the early cases supported the 
simple proposition that reissue was available only when a true “error” 
was found and that the cases would support the premise that Apple’s 
rule would “operate most unjustly against the public.”130  Judge 
Dyk’s statements that the Supreme Court cases would seem to 
support a position that Doll was wrongly decided, but not support the 
Board’s decision, are intriguing.131  Could the panel rule in favor of 
Apple on this set of facts and still overturn Doll?  While such an 
outcome appears unlikely based on the prior opinions and the briefs, 
oral argument appears to at least crack the door open to such a 
possibility. 
¶33 The CAFC also appeared to struggle to define a rule to apply 
to broadening reissues going forward.  Apple’s counsel noted that the 
USPTO’s legal argument had shifted throughout the course of the 
appeal process:132 the examiner was concerned with the reissue 
declaration, the Board was concerned with embodiments, and the 
briefs insisted that the test was “unforeseeable.”  Thus, the test was 
totally “unworkable” and could never be pinned down.133  The 
judges, particularly Judge O’Malley, seemed to seize on this point.  
Judge O’Malley criticized the USPTO’s argument in several 
instances, stating, “Your test is a bit of a moving target,”134 “I still 
can’t understand what your test is, other than ‘I know it when I see 
it.’  What is your test?”135 and “You’ve sort of avoided using words 
like ‘unforeseeable’ here . . . and yet you used them in your brief . . . 
are you moving away from that test?”136  Lamarca responded that the 
examination was consistent because the embodiments at issue were 
“totally unrelated” to the subject matter in the original declaration and 
reissue application.137  But Judge O’Malley, sounding somewhat 
exasperated, asked, “How is something totally unrelated to a subject 
matter if it comes out of the same specification?”138  Lamarca merely 
                                                
129 Id. at 21:38 (referring to a “foreseeable” error correction reserved within the 
statutory time period versus any error). 
130 Id. at 22:28. 
131 Id. at 21:30. 
132 Id. at 9:07. 
133 Id. at 9:25. 
134 Id. at 16:57. 
135 Id. at 18:38. 
136 Id. at 24:13. 
137 Id. at 24:34. 
138 Id. at 24:42. 
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responded that he did not feel the statute could be read in this manner, 
suggesting that he understood the importance (and potential 
weakness) of defining terms like “unforeseeable” and “unrelated.” 
¶34 Two other exchanges from the USPTO’s argument are worth 
highlighting.  At the end of the respondent’s argument, Judge Reyna 
asked Lamarca a question about the effects of broadening reissue 
applications on innovation: “It seems to me though that [broadening 
reissue practice] advances innovation, and that encourages . . . 
creativity by the inventors.  If we were to adopt the PTO’s 
determination, what would that do to innovation within the American 
patent system?”139  Mr. Lamarca responded that the “opposite” would 
be true: adopting Apple’s determination would take away public 
notice, and “blurring” the lines of the patent would discourage 
innovation.140  Given Apple’s history of innovation in the 
consumer-electronics field, it would have been interesting to hear 
Apple’s answer had it been presented with a similar question.  
Second, in response to a question by Judge O’Malley, Mr. Lamarca 
stated, “[Y]ou can’t take back what you’ve already given to the 
public . . .” with regard to clearly demarcating the lines of the patent 
property right.141  Although in a different intellectual property 
context, this position is an intriguing one for the government given 
the 2011 Fall Term Supreme Court case Golan v. Holder.142 
¶35 Although the points raised at oral argument generally 
followed those presented in the briefs, some interesting insights 
emerged as the argument proceeded.  Apple maintained stare decisis 
principles dictated that the forty years of practice since Doll should 
                                                
139 Id. at 28:09 (responding to Mr. Lamarca’s contention that if Apple’s 
determination were upheld, “tomorrow” a deluge of inventors would go to the 
PTO and file broadening reissue applications). 
140 Id. at 28:25. 
141 Id. at 23:25. 
142 609 F.3d 1076 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 1600 (2011) (No. 
10-545), argued, Oral Argument, Golan v. Holder (No. 10-545) (Oct. 5, 2011), 
available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_audio_detail.aspx?argu
ment=10-545.  In Golan, various interested parties are challenging the 
constitutionality of section 104A of the Copyright Act, which was added by way 
of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act.  The provision restores copyright to a 
subset of foreign works that had previously been in the public domain; thus, it is 
interesting to hear a government attorney argue here that the public can never 
lose what intellectual property rights holders had given them.   
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support its arguments, while the USPTO claimed again that Apple’s 
proposed practice was unsupportable under the statutes and rules, and 
denied proper notice to the public.  While the overall tenor of the oral 
argument was cordial, there certainly were tense, heated moments, 
mostly between Judge Dyk and Apple’s counsel Whealan.  Judge 
O’Malley seemed to be the more aggressive interrogator of the 
USPTO’s Lamarca, and Judge Reyna may be the critical vote on this 
panel.  In addition, Judge Dyk’s question “How often does this 
problem come up?”143 suggests that the panel may wrestle with the 
question of just how broad or narrow real-world applications of any 
prospective holding might be.  The court may choose to rule narrowly 
simply on the set of facts in Staats, or it may take the opportunity to 
make a more sweeping pronouncement on the boundaries of 
broadening reissue practice. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
“In . . . reissues more deviltry, if I may be permitted to use the phrase, 
creeps into the practice of patent law than everything else put 
together.  Reissues ought to be guarded carefully . . . .”144 
¶36 In many ways, broadening reissue practice is a headache for 
patent attorneys today, just as it was in the 1870s.  Considering the 
remarkable body of case law and commentary addressing the concept 
of broadening reissues and attempts to alter its implementation and 
practice, we have come full circle since the earliest efforts to rein in 
the potential for—and actual abuse of—reissue patent practice.  The 
issue now before the CAFC is distilled down to a question of how 
long is too long to give adequate public notice in broadening reissue 
applications.  And what must that “notice” entail?  How much notice 
must be given when reissue applicants seek to pursue broader reissue 
patent claims directed to embodiments that may differ from those 
sought initially?  In addition to the two-year statutory window for 
broadening reissues, and the “foreseeability” aspect applied in Staats 
and earlier cases, the authors believe that a reasonable balance must 
be achieved between providing adequate public notice in broadening 
reissue patent applications, while still providing enforceable rights for 
patent owners. 
                                                
143 Oral Argument, supra note 117, at 26:20. 
144 ARGUMENTS BEFORE THE COMM. ON PATENTS OF THE S. AND H.R., S. MISC. 
DOC. NO. 45-50, at 104–05 (2d Sess. 1878) (statement of M.D. Leggett, ex-
Commissioner of Patents); see also Federico, supra note 10, at 610. 
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¶37 There is a need to rein in any unbounded145 “shifting” of 
subject matter claimed in chains of continuation broadening reissue 
applications filed years after the initial two-year statutory window for 
filing a broadening reissue application.  The CAFC should create a 
mechanism for the USPTO to implement that would limit excessive 
alteration of patent claim scope by reissue and the use of such 
applications solely as a means to capture previously unforeseen 
competitors and their equally unforeseen products. 
¶38 The limiting mechanism must be calibrated to permit 
appropriate alterations of claim scope in reissue applications, and 
even in continuing broadening reissue applications, which can be 
beneficial to inventors and provide the necessary means to correct 
later-discovered mistakes in a patent.146  In such legitimate 
circumstances, continuing broadening reissue applications should be 
permitted outside the two-year statutory window if unequivocal intent 
to broaden is demonstrated in an initial broadening reissue 
application.  The devil is in the details, however, because it will be 
difficult to define reasonable bounds of permissibility (in time and in 
scope) for continuing broadening reissue applications.  For example, 
what is an “unequivocal” intent to broaden, and how long is too long 
to permit broadening of any kind, especially in the context of 
continuations of broadening reissue applications? 
¶39 One possible solution, though perhaps difficult to implement 
in practice, would be to require inventors to scour their patent and 
provide multiple examples of errors (assuming there are multiple 
errors) in the declaration accompanying an initial broadening reissue 
application.  That is, inventors would explain in their declaration any 
number of possible “errors” and specify possible avenues for 
claiming subject matter not earlier claimed due to mistake, as well as 
a detailed explanation of why such errors do not constitute 
impermissible recapture of surrendered subject matter.  Then, the 
inventors would be limited to pursuing families of broadening reissue 
applications (including continuations thereof) with claims limited to 
only those errors initially identified.  This declaration could serve a 
                                                
145 Unbounded in terms of scope, while still clearly bounded by the term of the 
parent patent. 
146 See Topliff v. Topliff, 145 U.S. 156, 171 (1892) (“Under such circumstances, 
it would be manifestly unjust to deny him the benefit of a reissue to secure to 
him his actual invention, provided it is evident that there has been a mistake and 
he has been guilty of no want of reasonable diligence in discovering it . . . .”). 
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public-notice function, by apprising the public of the possible scope 
of reissue applications stemming from a given patent vis-à-vis the 
declaration accompanying an initial broadening reissue application.  
The counterpoint to this proposal, of course, is that it may be difficult 
or impossible to recognize all possible errors at the time of filing an 
initial broadening reissue application, and that additional errors 
sometimes may not come to light until inventors are deeply involved 
in prosecution of the initial broadening reissue application. 
¶40 Moreover, how should one define “unrelated” or 
“unforeseeable” embodiments?  And how would these definitions 
affect patent owners’ rights?  For example, in today’s white-hot 
“smartphone” market, product development is so rapid and the 
product lifecycle is so short (a fraction of the length of a patent term) 
that it may be impossible to predict all possible future variations that 
competitors might attempt to exploit in designing around a patent.  
¶41 To take just one simple example: assume an inventor 
discloses a novel portable electronic device and has patent claims 
directed to its screen and user interface.  The inventor has a robust 
disclosure of the device, its screen, its functionality, user interface, 
display, battery, software, etc.  Along comes a competitor (within two 
years of patent grant) who intends to market a similar yet 
noninfringing device.  Assume the competitor attempts a design-
around to change the user interface and provide a remarkably long-
lasting battery to power a similar device.  Should the inventor be 
permitted to file a broadening reissue application within two years to 
pursue claims directed to the competitor’s user interface (assuming 
support from the patent disclosure and no attempt at recapture)?  
Probably yes.  Now, assume the original inventor’s disclosure 
broadly describes the battery used in the claimed device, but the 
inventor never included any claims directed to the battery in either 
the patent or an initial broadening reissue application.  Should the 
inventor be permitted to file a continuation of that broadening reissue 
application after two years to add claims to a battery for a portable 
electronic device?  This question is more complicated.  Would claims 
to a battery have been “foreseeable” to a competitor having 
knowledge of the original patent and its disclosure?  Perhaps.  Would 
claims to a battery be considered “unrelated” to the original device 
and user interface claims for the portable electronic device?  Possibly.  
One can readily see that this is a gray area defying simple 
categorization. 
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¶42 There must be a balancing to promote competition while still 
protecting patent owners’ rights, in order to allow patent owners to 
maintain the value of their patent by later claiming more broadly that 
which they were originally entitled to claim.  Overall patent value 
may otherwise decrease if the potential scope of broadening reissues 
is curtailed.  For example, in the smartphone market, patent value 
could diminish significantly after a short time, especially if a patent 
owner is not permitted to mine (within reason) a robust patent 
disclosure for unclaimed subject matter. 
¶43 So where should we place the fulcrum in this balance?  One 
possibility is for the CAFC to judicially implement a hard time limit 
on filing continuations of broadening reissue applications.  For 
example, there could be a time limit requiring the filing of any 
continuing broadening reissue applications within three years after 
the initial two-year window for the first broadening reissue 
application.  Thus, all broadening reissue patent applications 
(including any continuations) would have to be filed within five years 
of the initial patent grant, with expiration of any reissue patents still 
tied to the original patent’s term.  Five years is a long time in the 
smartphone market.  For example, just after the iPhone® 4S release, 
one will notice that there are not many people carrying the original 
iPhone® from 2007.  That being said, however, there are likely many 
patented features in the original iPhone® that are still aggressively 
being litigated today. 
¶44 The problem for the CAFC, if it attempts to establish a bright-
line rule for capping continuing broadening reissue applications, is 
that it is difficult to objectively and even-handedly apply such a rule 
to patents overall and across so many industries and technologies.147  
                                                
147 For example, patents in the biopharmaceutical industry are particularly 
valuable towards the end of their term as they recoup time lost due to FDA 
approval and fend off generic competitors, whereas in industries such as 
semiconductors, patents may more quickly become obsolete before the end of 
their term.  See Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Study of the Twenty Year Patent 
Term, 22 AIPLA Q.J. 369, 377 n.32 (1994) (“There is some evidence, however, 
that the value of patents over time may differ by industry.  For example, because 
of regulatory delays, patents in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries 
may be more valuable at the end of their term than at the beginning.”); see also 
Robert L. Risberg, Jr., Comment, Five Years Without Infringement Litigation 
Under the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act; Unmasking the Spectre of Chip 
Piracy in an Era of Diverse and Incompatible Process Technologies, 1990 WIS. 
L. REV. 241, 252 (1990) (“In addition, some companies neglect to patent facets 
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Sometimes, however, courts seem to favor bright-line rules.  Other 
times, they prefer overly complicated or case-specific approaches 
with many corollaries that soon muddy even their most 
straightforward application. 
¶45 Broadening reissue practice may remain a headache for patent 
attorneys regardless of the outcome in Staats.  We must hope that the 
CAFC uses the occasion of the Staats case to impart a reasonable and 
fair balance between adequate public notice and enforceable rights 
for patent owners in broadening reissue patent applications. 
                                                                                                         
of a chip that are eligible because the chip may be obsolete by the time the 
Patent and Trademark Office issues a patent.”). 
